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MANAGERIAL RISK A VERSION A N D
LIMITS ON CORPORATE DEBT*
Walt Woe rhe ide
and
Hans Heymann
Textbook authors frequently cite wealth maximization as the goal
of the firm. They also note that decision-making for large corporations
today is usually done by professional managers rather than by the
stockholder-owners. That these two groups may have different goals is
held to be relatively inconsequential. and all of the subsequent presentation is made from the viewpoint of the stockholder-owner goal of
wealth maximization.I Yet, there remains much evidence in the
literature that managers follow goals other than wealth
maximization.2 Donaldson (10), for example. has outlined several
areas in which managers would make policy decisions different than
those preferred by stockholders due to differences in objectives.
In this paper. we look at how the pursuit of a managerial goal
other than wealth maximization affects the capital structure of the
firm. This alternative goal is the maximization of wealth subject to a
given probability that net income will be at or above a minimum acceptable level. In Section II. several definitions of the minimum acceptable
level of net income are presented. Empirical evidence that such a concept is used by decision makers is reviewed in Sec tion III. In Section IV.
a model of the firm is provided and Chebyshev·s inequality is applied to
the model to show how a minimum acc eptable level of net income limits
the amount of debt a firm issues. A discussion of the model is presented
in Section V and Section VI provides the summary and conclusions.
The conclusions derived in this paper are that in a world of wealth
maximization constrained by minimum acceptable net income. the upper limit on the amount of debt issued by any one firm is determined bv
two profit related measures. two aspects of managerial risk aversion.
and the corporate tax rate. For the firm these are the mean and the
standard deviation of the expected operating income, and for the
manager they are the level of acceptable profits and the maximurr.
tolerated probability of not achieving that level. The maximum amo·mt
of debt issued is positively related to the level of expected profit!> ,rnd
the manager's tolerance for not achieving the minimum acceptable
level of profits. It is inversely rela led to the other three items.

.
*We would like to thank Professors Ric hard Cohn. Scott Williamson. and Eugene Carter for comments and ideas concerning this paper
or course, th e auth ors are responsible
.
·
for any remaini ng errors.
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I. Definitions of Minimum Acceptable Profits
There are al least three different definitions of the • •
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restric~wns on t_ e company or to ms1st on having a direct voice in the
formation of policy. A second and more traditional a rgument as towh
a manager worries about achieving the necessary income to Y
cr_editors is ~he cost of bankruptcy proceedings. A company which ru:;
misses earning the m1mmum amount necessary to pay creditors would
find its losses to be even greater due to the expense of bankruptcy.4
A second definition of the minimum acceptable level of profits is
that needed in order to be able to sell more securities in the future.
(See. e.g., Baumol (2)). But. if enough insightful investors are able pro.
perlv to evaluate the future prospects of a firm. then a poor record
should not restrict a company's access to external capital.
The third definition of a minimum acceptable level is that
necessary for a manager to retain his job. It should be noted that the
level of income necessary to maintain one's job is necessarily that level
which causes a firm lo declare bankruptcy. Warner (22) notes in his
study of railroads that the chief executive officers of the nonbankrupt
firms were repla ced with a slightly greater frequency than those of
bankrupt firms in the same period! One economic reason why executives may fear loss of jobs is that their present positions may he
substantially more lucrative than alternatives available to them. This
would likely be true of managers who have been with a firm a long time
and whose abilities have become highly specialized to the point that
their incomes consist more of "rent" than of competitively determined
returns. Another reason is Iha t a job change for a manager might involve a large fi xed cost. One component of the fixed cost would be the
opportunity cost of lost salary while searching for a new job, although
this cost would be reduced by the amount of severance pay. This opportunity cost may be quite large if the manager has been fired or is pas!
his prime years of productivity. A second component of the fixed cos!
may be the loss of some of the retirement benefits if an individual is_not
full y vested. A final component would be any moving costs that m1ghl
be required.
JI. Evidence of Minimum Accepta ble Level of Profits

The intuitive appeal of a minimum acceptable rate of return mus!
be rather strong since it is frequently s uggested in the literature
Baumol (3), for exa mple, expands upon an earlier model by Roy (2llt0
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d nstrate that within the portfolio theory framework the relevant
ri:;:easure for an individual is not standard deviation per se but the
lower confidence limit of the return.
If managers let the criterion of H minimum acceptable level of pr0fits constrain their efforts lo maximize wealth. then thev would tend to
obtain equal or lower rates of return than owner-managers who wern
not so constrained. There is ample empirical evi<lence (5. 6. 11. 18. 19.
and 20) that this difference in profitability occurs. The researchers
each eva luate various meHsures of return (an<l in one case {5). a
measure of risk) for manager-operated and for owner-controlle<l firms.
They find that owner-mntrolled firms have highlir rates of return a11d
higher risk than manager-controlled firms. It is not dear. however.
that managerial concern about a minimum acceptable level of profits is
the cause of this apparent c onserva !ism among mnnagers as opposed
to owner-managers.
Fortunatelv. there is altPrnative empirical work whic:h direr-tly
shows that managers use a minimum ;icc:Pptalile ra le nf return
criterion. Mao [161 survevs corporate managers with resper. t to their
capital budgP.ling <lec.isions an<l fimb thHI if tlw project is "smHlt.·· risk
is defined in terms of not meeting H tari:wt rate of return. but if the prnject requires most of the i:ompanv·s resourc es. risk is defined in terms
of bankruptcv.
Alderfer an<l Biermiln {1) use stu<lents to test !ht? tixtiml to which
the first two momt!nts of rdurn p,xplnin c:hoicP.s involving risk. ThP.\'
find tha t other fndors, such as the pos:;ibilitv of a loss. are nec·ess arv
to explai n many of the choices madti. Conrath 19) limits his samplti lo
nine manage.rs of Ont! corporation and r11ad1es the sa11w condusion.
Greer (12 ) usP.s ..i IBst group similar to that usrnl hv ~1ao. and 1·011clud1!s
that " the minimum pos~ib)f' outl'omti assof'iated with n riskv proje.-t 1s
an important fac:tor in rea l-world <lcl'ision processes - that firms
operate a lmost in acn1r<lanc:ci with a MINi l\1AX rule of some sort or
that decis ion maktirs arP. undnr gwat pressurn to avoi<l ;inv chancn llf a
project outcome lower than sonrn specified mirumum."5
III. How Minimum Acceptable Profits Affect Capital Structure
To d!!monstrahi how the existenc·e of a minimum an:eptahle l1nt>I
of net in<'omn affeds tlw capital struc:ture of n firm. we assume thnt I
the fi rm isswis common stoc:k and onn dass of bonds with a fix,,,:
coupon rate and that 2) o[Jerating in, :ome is a stuchaslil' vari,tlil .
whose mean and variance art! known at the start of each period. Hasud
on these nssumptions. the net income of tlrn firm each period is clef11H!d

as

Nl(t) -= X(t) (I - tr] - i8{1 - tr)
where Nl(t)

1ll

net inc:ome in perio<l t
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X(t) = operating income in pe r iod t

tr = effective tax rate
= the coupon rate on debt
and

B = the face-value or debt outstanding.

Given the
. mean and the variance
. or the
. opera ting income, the mean
and variance or the corresponding net income can be derived as

E(NI) = E(X) (1 - tr) - iB(l - tr)

and

Var(NI) = Var(X) (1 - tr}2.

(2)

(3]
For convenience, the time parameter is omitted in subsequent equations.
We stale without proof the traditional result that the model shows
that increases in financial leverage increase the expected rate of
return on equity. Thus. if a manager is rewarded according to his per.
formance. he might increase the firm's financial leverage to improve
the firm's expected rate of return. However, increases in leverage also
increase the chance of achieving an unacceptable level of net income.
It is beca use of this possibility that managers place an upper limit on
the amount of debt they issue.
Chebyshev·s inequality is used to demonstrate the effect of
minimum acceptable profits on debt in response to arguments thal
much of the theoretical work in business is inapplicable to empirical
problems because the former often requires that distribution functions
be known, when in reality thev are not (see. e.g., (4), (13) and(7))and
Chebyshev·s inequality requires only that the mean and variance of the
random variable be known. The inequality states that

r c Iv
where

2
- E(Y)l~ko) -< l/k

[41

y = a random variable for which only the mean and
varianr.e or its distribution are known

k = a positive constant

a

standard deviation of the random variable Y

p = probability operator.
In words, equation (4} stales that the probability is less than one over
k-squared Iha t an observa lion will differ from its e"pected value by an
amount greater thank times the standard deviation.
The minimum acceptable level of profit is defined as
d = E(Nl) - ko(NI)
where d = minimum accep table level or net income.
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[5)

1

We assume that each manager knows, in dollar terms. what the
· t alue of d is for him.6 Since we have also assumed that the
appropr1a e v
.
k
h
nd standard deviation of net income are nown. t en
expected va lue a
the value of k is derived as
(6)

k = E (N-I) - d
cr(N-1)

7
k is then 8 measure of the manager's degree of risk tolerance.
The relationship between risk tolerance and capital structure can
be demonstrated by substituting equation (6) into equation (4) and
defining the random variable in (4) as net income. This substitution

shows that

- {NI} - d IB) -<

- N > E

where

2 cr (NI)

(7)

N = the actual net income that will he received
next pericxi and.

2 -

cr {NI }

thus

(8)

Note that the ahsolute value notation is omitted in equation (7) because
only the observations below the expected value of net income are relevant.8
If the minimum acceptable net income is zero. then equation 18)
has the rather interesting interpretation that the probability of
negative land hence unacceptable) net income is less than the square
of the coefficient of variation of net income. However. d need not
necessa rily be zero and we shall proceed on the morn general assumption that it could be any value.
Equation (8) could he viewed as a descriptive statement in the
sense that it defines the probability of an una cceptable net income for
a given amount of debt. It can be converted to a debt policy statement
by a manager defining a maximum p robability q of achieving a net income less than the minimum acceptable amount. q is the maximum probability the manager can tolerate, and is defined as

P(N

di 13)

o 2 (N-I)

<
< (E {N-1} - d) 2 - q

{9)

In other words, once a manager pid.s q. then he selects the amount of
debt he will issue so that the probabili ty of an unacceptable net income, P[N dJB). is less than or equal to the term o 2(NIY(E{NI}- d)2, which
49

is in turn less than or equal to q · For ana lytical purposes. we wish 10
focus on t h e Iast two terms of this equation. namely
a 2 (N-I}

q > ----

(E (N-1 ) - d) 2

{9a}

where q = the
acceptable probability the manager will
.
. maximum
.
o
era
te
o
ac
1evmg
an
unacceptable
level
of
net
income.
h
f
t I
Equation (9a) can then be modified as

q

-

-

>

a {NI}
(E {Ni} - d)

=

o{X) (1 -tr)

E(X) (1 - tr) - i13(1 - tr) - d

{10}

Equation {10) can be solved for the maximum amount of debt the
manager would issue for a specified value of q as

B <
-

1
.

l

(E { X}

a(X}

Ill}

-1q

As an example of an application of equation {11}. suppose a
manager decides that he can tolerate no more than a 1°o probabilit1· o!
achieving an unaccepta hie rate of return which he defines as zero net
income. Suppose also that the expected value of operating income is
$120.000. its s tandard deviation 1s $5.000 .. the firm pavs a coupon rate
of 10°0 and the tax rate is 48°0 .
Then: q = .01 E()S) - $ 120.000
5.000
= .10 a(Xtr =_ 48
d = 0
and

1

82. To{l20 , 000

_ 5,000

- 0)

= S700,000

For the values stated above. the mux1mum amount of deht the mana~E
would issue would be $700.000. If anv more debt were issued. then It
probability that net incume would be less than the minimum acceptab
0
amount of zero might be greater than l o.
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IV. A Discussion of the Model
1

Several observa tions can be made about the model. Two obvious
t tements a re that 1) firms with higher levels of expected operating
~n~ome, ceteris poribus. would issue more debt, and 2) firms with
higher standard deviations of operating income, ceteris poribus. would
issue less debt.9 Two additional observations that can be made from
equation [11) relate to the manager. The first is that the higher the
minimum level of operating income the manager deems acceptable.
ceteris poribus. the lower amount of debt that would be issued. Also,
the higher the probability of obta ining less than the minimum acceptable level of operating income that the manager can tolerate. ceteris
poribus. the greater the amount of debt that can be issued. To our
knowledge, these latter two hypotheses have not been empirically
tested.
It is also apparent from the model that an increase in the tax rate.
ceteris poribus. will reduce the maximum amount of debt that the firm
might issue. The reason this reduction occurs is Iha t an increase in the
tax rate reduces the expected level of net income, without altering the
variance in net income. The tax deductible feature of the debt
mitigates the reduction in expected net income as the tax rate increases. but it does not offset it. So as long as dis fixed in dollar terms.
anything which reduces E(NI) in dollar terms without altering o2(NI).
will reduce the maximum amount of debt issued.
The model is derived from the most general set of conditions regarding the distribution of opera ting income. If more restrictive assumptions are made about this function. then the amount of debt permissible
for a given probability of unacceptable net income would be greater.
As an example, if the manager believes operating income has a symmetrical distribution, then equation (8) would be altered as shown
below:
•

P(d

>

NI)

<

0

1/2

(X)2

(E (X) - d)2

(8')

If all of the s ubsequent equations a re adjusted for this change. th£'n
equation (11) would be altered as follows

1

8 < - . {E ( X)
1

o (X)

- -- -

d
(1

_ tr) } ,

( 11' l

and the net effect is an increase in the maximum amount of debt issu••d.
In the numerical illustration of the previous section, the assumptw n of
a symmetrical distribution increases the maximum amount of debt
from $700.000 to $846.393.
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Equation (11) may not necessarily contradict the concept Of
timal capital structure as traditionally defined 10 The
~n op.
·
ma,nmum
amount of debt acceptable to a risk-averse manager as com t db
equ~tion (11) ~ay b~ greater than o_r e_qual to the amount that ~~:Id b!
c?ns1dered optimal m terms of max1m1zation of the ma rket value of the
firm.
Equation (11) can also be reconciled with recent work by M'll
For example, Miller (17) argues that once the level of interest rate; a:d
the corporate and personal tax structures are set, an equilibrium debt.
equity ratio for the corporate sector is defined. But he adds that there
is no optimum debt ratio for auy individual firm. Equation (11) indicates
why some firms would have less debt than others. In other words, even
if there is not an optimal capital structure. there still exists a maximum
limit on debt for each firm which is dependent on the characteristics of
the firm and the risk aversion of its managers.
V. Summary and Conclusions
The mauager is motivated by two considerations when he sets the
capital structure of the firm. The first is that the stockholder's expected return and hopefully his own remuneration can be increased by
using financial leverage. The second is that there is a limit on the
amount of debt Iha t will be used if there exists for the manager a
minimum acceptable level of net income. Exactly what that minimum
level of net income is depends on the circumstances of the firm and
the manager. However, because of the existence of a minimum acceptable level of net income. the amount of debt a manager will issue is
positively related to the expected level of operating income and the
tolerance that the manager has for the probability of not earning that
level of net income. The amount of debt will be negatively related lo the
standard deviation of operating income. the level of the minimum acceptable net income. and the tax rate.
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Footnotes

1See. e.g. Van Horne (23) Ch. 1. or Weston and Brigham [25)Ch.1.
Support for this pos1t1on is provided by Lewellen (14) who arguedthal
recent trends in compensation patterns have Jed to a congruenceof
stockholder and managerial interests as nearly half of after-tax corr,
pensation is tied to stock based devices.
2For a summary of the literature on managerial models. th!
reader is referred to E. Carter (8). See also W1lliamson (26).
3scott (22) has recently pointed out that "there is a limit on ho,
much new equity ca n be sold in any period to meet contractual intere;'
payments. New equity can be sold only as long as the total value ollh!
new equity to be issued is Jess than the total value of all equ1tv. giitr
that the interest obligation is paid ..... (p. 5).
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4Warner (22) suggests tha t the expense of corporate bankruptcy
may not be as great as has previously been suggested in the literature.
11 should also be noted that this argument begs the question of whether
investors have fully incorporated the effect of bankruptcy costs into
current estimates of risk and return.
5Greer (12) p. 502.
6The variables d and NI could also be defined in terms of returu on
equity or return on assets. The results will be the same, however. and
the use of levels is mathe matically more tractable. Also, d could be
defined in terms of net cash flow or operating income. In the model net
cash flow. operating income and net income are linear transformations
of each other.

L
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I

7As constructed, this is clearly a single-period model and may appear to be an inadequate description of a managerial decision model if
one were to argue that several years of unacceptable net income are
necessary for a manager to suffer severe consequences. However, if
th~ manager views the several yea rs as one long period. and defines
E(X). o(X), and d, accordingly, then the model as presented would still
be a pplica hie.

Srhe dropping of the absolute value notation would normally
mean that a stronger probability statement could be made. That is not
the case here. howeve r. because of our assumption that nothing is
known about the distribution of net income except the expected value
and variance. A discussion about additiona l assumptions is provided in
the next section.
9These are, of course, not uncommon themes in the financial
literature. See, e.g., Lewellen (15).
10

see, e.g., Weston and Brigham (25). Ch. 19. Appendix 8.
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